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Criminal Prosecution of United States Multinational
Corporations
DONALD H. J. HERMANN*
Since the early 1970's, the activities of American corporations
abroad acting directly or through subsidiaries have become a special
concern to government officials in the United States and to the
American public.' From the post-World War II period through the
1960's, the rise of the multinational corporation was regarded in this
country as a desirable development which was thought to be
uniquely suited for breaking down trade barriers, providing avenues
for American investment, serving as a source of profits which would
counter a developing balance of payments deficit, and facilitating
the maximization of the efficiency to be gained from the business
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, De Paul University College of Law. A.B., Stanford
University, 1965; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1968; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1974. Fellow in Law and the Humanities, Harvard University, 1973-1974; Fellow in
Law and Economics, University of Chicago, 1975-1976.
An earlier draft of this article was written while the author was a Fellow in Law and
Economics at the University of Chicago, 1975-1976. An earlier version of this article was
delivered at the International Conference on Criminal Law and Multinational Corporations,
Simposio Direito Penal e Multinacionais, A Federacao e o Centro de Comercio de Estato De
Sao Paulo, at Sao Paulo, Brazil, August 18-20, 1976.
1. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, The Multinational Corporation-An
Overview, a paper prepared by the Investment Policy Division, Office of International Invest-
ment, U.S. Department of Commerce in April, 1972, and included in UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED
TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE (1973). Since 1973, the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate has continued to hold hearings
on various multinational corporations and the nature of their operations. The first hearings
were held in March, 1973, and the most recent were held in December, 1975. See generally
Hearings on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Parts I-
XIII 93d-94th Cong. (1973-1976) [hereinafter cited as Multinational Corporations and
Foreign Policy]. Other congressional committees have also considered the operations and
impact of multinational corporations; these include: Committee on Finance; United States
Senate; the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate;
the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of the House of Representatives, as well as the Joint Economic Committee. Var-
ious departments of the executive branch, particularly the Department of State and the
Department of Commerce have devoted extensive attention to the activities of multinational
corporations.
For a widely read critical study of multinationals, see R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL
REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974). A balanced collection of
papers on the subject of multinational corporations was prepared by the American Assembly.
See G. BALL, GLOBAL COMPANIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS (1975).
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enterprise.' However, the tremendous growth in the number and
size of multinational firms, as well as the experience of an interna-
tional economic recession, has led to concern about the revenue
effect of foreign investment, the impact of the multinational firm
on capital movements, and the effects on American labor.'
Concern with the revenue effects of multinationals has brought
forth such proposals as the Burke-Hartke bill which would have
eliminated the tax deferral privilege, repealed the foreign tax credit,
required straight line depreciation, and repealed the exemption of
foreign earned income.' Study of the capital movements aspects of
United States multinational corporations has revealed that the
value of fixed assets of foreign affiliates of United States companies
amounts to at least twelve percent of fixed assets of the entire do-
mestic corporate sector, that annual plant and equipment expendi-
tures by foreign affiliates amounts to nearly twenty-five percent for
the manufacturing sector, that before-tax profits on United States
direct investments abroad have been approximately one-third of
total corporate profits before tax in the United States, and that sales
by majority-owned foreign affiliates of American companies are over
four times the level of all United States exports. Concern with these
capital effects has led to congressional hearings and the introduc-
tion of bills to provide for executive branch study of the economic
impact of multinational activity on the United States economy.' In
2. See E. KOLDE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 232 (1968). In discussing the bene-
fits to be gained from the multinational enterprise, the author concludes: "Its real meaning
and value lie in minimizing the abnormalities and perversions and in enabling international
business relations to develop according to the normal price and cost patterns rather than to
arbitrary restraints. Multinationalism has opened up new areas of profitable endeavor for
business and industry and has paved the way for direct contact with and among operating
facilities in foreign areas." Id.
3. See generally Hearings on Multinational Corporations Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) including a
reprint of REPORT By THE STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE
CoMMIrrEE ON FINANCE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (1973),
describing criticism of the multinational firm: "In the United States, organized labor has
charged that multinational corporations export American jobs through the transfer of pre-
cious technology and productive facilities to foreign nations; erode our tax base and exacer-
bate our balance of payments problems." Id. at 397.
4. H.R. 62 and S. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102-05 (1973), reintroduced as S. 2124, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); see COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
MULTINATIONALS PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE AND TAXES, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (July, 1973). See
also Fisher, The Multinationals and the Crisis in United States Trade and Investment Policy,
53 B.U.L. REv. 308 (1973).
5. SUrBCOMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD AND THE MULTINATIONAL: EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES
ECONOMY (1975) (Musgrave Report).
6. See, e.g., S. 3151,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See generally Multinational Corporations
and Foreign Policy, supra note 1.
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a study commissioned by the Department of State, the conclusion
was reached that most foreign investment directly displaces domes-
tic investment and results in the loss of hundreds of thousands of
jobs per year. The researchers responsible for the State Department
study testified that: "Our calculations show that, using best esti-
mates of the home-foreign substitution factors, in 1970, the net
impact of foreign investment on domestic employment was a net
loss of more than 160,000 U.S. jobs." 7 Concern with labor effects of
multinational corporations has also led to demands for further study
and for specific legislation to reduce the attractiveness of foreign
investment.8
While some question has developed as to the desirability of unres-
trained multinational business activity of American based firms,
there has been at the same time a widespread concern that regard-
less of the economic desirability or inevitability of the multinational
firm, there is a need to make certain that these enterprises operate
in compliance with the basic public policies of the United States
Government and that they operate within the legal parameters es-
tablished to police and regulate economic activity. The shared belief
that American based firms must operate within the framework es-
tablished for domestic corporations has produced government pros-
ecutions and investigations with concomitant proposals for enforce-
ment, legislation, or regulation in three principal areas: the prohi-
bition and punishment of anti-competitive activity,' payment of
bribes to foreign officials," and acts subversive of foreign govern-
ments." After a brief consideration of the nature of corporate crimi-
nal liability, this article will focus on the use of criminal sanction,
in the latter three areas.
CORPORATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAWS
Corporate Criminal Liability
The use of criminal sanctions against corporations is well estab-
lished in American law.'2 In discussing criminal sanctions against
7. Id. at 56 (testimony of Robert Frank and Richard Freeman of Cornell University).
8. Id. at 93, reprinting Statement of Jacob Clayman, Secretary-Treasurer, Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO.
9. See, e.g., Hearings on the International Aspects of Antitrust Laws Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. (1973 & 1974).
10. See, e.g., Hearings on Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Parts I & 11, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
11. See, e.g., Multinational Corporations and Foreign Policy, supra note 1.
12. New York Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909): "[Tlhere is a
large class of offenses, of which relating under the Federal statutes is one, wherein the crime
19771
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multinational corporations, it should be recognized that civil law
countries do not recognize the criminal liability of corporations.
This is a result of their strict adherence to a requirement of intent
for criminal liability which cannot be imputed in civil law.' 3 Indeed,
the early common law theory which continued through the middle
of the nineteenth century was that corporations were not criminally
liable. 4 Early efforts were made to limit corporate criminal liability
to nonfeasances; this was based on the legal principle of actus non
facit reum, nisi mens rea.15 For instance, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court held at the end of the nineteenth century:
"Corporations cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their
criminality from evil intent, or which consist in a violation of those
social duties which pertain to men and subjects."'"
It is now recognized in American law that the intent, knowledge,
or willfulness of a corporate agent or employee may be imputed to
a corporation.'7 Since a corporation can act only through its agents,
consists in purposely doing the things prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we see no
good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge
and purpose of their agents acting within the authority conferred upon them." See generally
Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of
Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280 (1961). A review of the development of corporate criminal liability
is provided in Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1928).
13. See Schneider, The German Code of Regulatory Offenses, in E. WISE & G. MUELLER,
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 265 (1975):
The German Penal Code of 1871 took almost no notice of crimes committed by
corporations. Despite a great number of amendments to the code since that time,
this situation has not greatly changed. Such abstention from the imposition of
corporate criminal liability was probably a consequence not only of the systematic
problems which would otherwise be posed but was also based on ideological consid-
erations. . . . The whole notion of legal prescriptions directed at legal entities as
opposed to natural persons represents a new departure for the German law of
sanctions. The imposition of sanctions on corporations which has long been tradi-
tional in Anglo-American law is practically blasphemous in German doctrine as a
result of the requirement of guilt. Such sanctions have become possible in Germany
only by construing them as collateral consequences of the sanctions imposed on
natural persons.
Id. See also Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 28 (1957).
14. 1 Bl. Comm. [1765] bk. 1, ch. 18, p. 476: "A corporation cannot commit treason, or
felony or any other crime in its corporate capacity though its members .may in their distinct
individual capacities." The liability of a corporation to a criminal indictment was first recog-
nized by the English courts in Regina v. The Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co., 3 Q.B.
223 (1842).
15. See, e.g., Peaks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward [1902] 2 K.B. 1, 11, where the court
observed: "By the general principles, if a matter is made a criminal offense, it is essential
that there should be something in the nature of a mens rea, and therefore in ordinary cases a
corporation cannot be guilty of a criminal offense, nor can a master be liable criminally for
an offense committed by his servant."
16. Commonwealth v. Proprieters of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 345, 399 (1854).
17. See, e.g., Boise Bridge, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1969), where
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it is clear that corporate criminal liability is necessarily vicarious."8
In order to establish corporate liability for an offense requiring spe-
cific criminal intent, it must be shown that the corporate agent was
acting in the course of employment and within the scope of duty."9
While it must be shown that the corporate agent intended to benefit
the corporation by his conduct, 0 it is not necessary to demonstrate
actual benefit to the enterprise."'
Although early cases required that the criminal act be done by
someone with a high corporate office, 2 it is now recognized that any
corporate employee acting within the scope of employment can cre-
ate criminal liability for the corporation.2 3 Nevertheless, there is
some division of authority with regard to the level and nature of
corporate authorization of an agent's conduct which creates the
corporate criminal liability. The Model Penal Code, as well as many
state courts, would limit the situations where a corporation could
be convicted of a criminal offense to those where "the commission
of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his
office or employment. '24 The Code goes on to define "high manage-
rial agent" to be "an officer of a corporation. 2 5 The drafters' com-
mentary to the Model Penal Code notes that the effort is to limit
corporate criminal liability; the drafters state that the section
the court observed that "a corporation through the conduct of its agents and employees, may
be convicted of a crime, including a crime involving knowledge and willfulness." See also
United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
18. See Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60 HARv. L.
REv. 283 (1946).
19. See, e.g., Shumate & Co. v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 509 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1972), holding
that "the purpose to benefit the corporation is decisive in terms of equating the agent's action
with that of the corporation." See also Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943).
21. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1962), where
the court in considering the significance of an agent's act concludes that if it "is done with a
view of furthering the master's business, of doing something for the master, then the expecta-
tion or hope of a benefit, whether direct or indirect, makes the act that of the principal. The
act is no less the principal's if from such intended conduct either no benefit accrues, a benefit
is undiscernible, or, for that matter, the result turns out to be adverse." See also United
States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
22. See, e.g., Denver & R. G. Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 (1887).
23. See, e.g., United States v, George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 869 (1946).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962). See also People v. Cana-
dian Fur Trappers, 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
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"would result in corporate liability for the conduct of the corporate
president or general manager but not for the conduct of a foreman
in a large plant or of an insignificant branch manager in the absence
of participation at higher levels of corporate authority;" this result
stems from the intention of the drafters to establish "a substantial
limitation on corporate responsibility.''2
The proposed Federal Criminal Code (S. 1), however, would
maintain the broadened liability of a corporation for an employees'
conduct as long as it is within the scope of duty or is later ratified.
Section 402 of the proposed code provides that a corporation is
criminally liable for an offense if the conduct of its agent "occurs
in the performance of matters within the scope of the agent's em-
ployment or within the scope of the agent's actual implied or appar-
ent authority" or "is thereafter ratified by the organization. 127 The
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee makes it clear that there
is no intention to limit corporate criminal liability as was done in
the Model Penal Code. The Report observes: "this section does not
limit criminal liability to acts authorized, requested or commanded
by supervisory or control persons, but continues existing law render-
ing organizations criminally liable for the act of any agent within
the area of duties or functions entrusted to him. ' 28 The position
adopted by the drafters of S. 1 has been recognized by some state
courts; for instance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has stated:2
[W]e are of the opinion that the quantum of proof necessary to
sustain the conviction of a corporation for the acts of its agents is
sufficiently met if it is shown that the corporation has placed the
agent in a position where he has enough authority and responsibil-
ity to act for and in behalf of the corporation in handling the
particular corporate business, operation or project in which he was
engaged at the time he committed the criminal act. . . . [TIhis
standard does not depend upon the responsibility or authority
which the agent has with respect to the entire corporate business,
26. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
27. S. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402 (1976).
28. S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1976). See also United States v. Union
Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909).
29. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 257, 275 N.E.2d 33, 86
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972) (emphasis in the original). The court identified three
factors in evaluating whether the conduct of a corporate employee is within the scope of his
authority and a basis for finding corporate criminal liability: "(1) the extent of control and
authority exercised by the individual over and within the corporation; (2) the extent and
manner to which corporate funds were used in the crime, and (3) a repeated pattern of
criminal conduct tending to indicate corporate toleration or ratification of the agent's acts."
Id.
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but only to his position with relation to the particular business in
which he was serving the corporation.
The fact that an agent of the corporation engaged in conduct in
contradiction to instructions, or even acted beyond the scope of his
duty, will not relieve the corporation of liability if a corporate officer
has failed to properly supervise the agent.3 1 It has been held that it
is the duty of the principal officers of the corporation to supervise
subordinates and to ensure that they perform their duties in a man-
ner consistent with the law.3'
A corporation can be held criminally liable without a conviction
of the corporate employee. 31 In fact, convictions of corporations have
been sustained even though the corporate agent has been acquit-
ted.33 This possibility of corporate liability becomes important in
the case of multinational firms where the employee may be a foreign
subject who engages in his criminal conduct outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States, and thus, is beyond the jurisdic-
tional reach of United States courts. The basis for the American
based firms' liability will be the direction of the criminal conduct,
the adoption or ratification of the agent's acts, or the toleration of
the employee's conduct.34
Criminal Sanctions
The remainder of this article will consider efforts by the United
States Congress to control and regulate the foreign activities of
American based firms through the use of criminal sanctions.3 5 The
next section will review the current state of antitrust enforcement
involving foreign activities of firms based in the United States. Spe-
cial attention will be directed at the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust laws which experience can serve as an anal-
ogy for other extensions of the application of United States law
30. See, e.g., United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, 464 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1972).
31. United States v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814, 820 (D. Md. 1957). See
also People v. Sheffield Farm-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 121 N.E. 474 (1918), where
it was observed that an officer of the corporation "must then stand or fall with those whom
he selects to act for him. . . . It is not an instance of respondent superior. It is the case of
non-performance of a non-delegable duty." Id.
32. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 282 U.S. 25 (1930).
33. See, e.g., Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960).
35. The function of the use of criminal sanctions against the corporation is a subject that
has been widely discussed in the literature and is generally beyond the scope of this article.
See generally Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary, 29 Sw. L.J. 908,
917-26 (1975); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423 (1963).
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beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. The follow-
ing two sections of the article will first consider proposed efforts to
control practices of bribes and corrupt payments abroad and will
then examine the attention given by the United States government
to the control of activities of American based firms which are sub-
versive of foreign governments.
It should be understood that the primary motivation of the var-
ious government departments, agencies, and legislative committees
of the United States is to protect the competitive structure and
business behavior of American companies, including export compa-
nies, from possible anticompetitive consequences of the operation of
multinational corporations, and to maintain the confidence of the
American investor who is disturbed by reports of bribes and pay-
ments to foreign officials by companies operating in the American
securities market. The United States, by itself, does not aim to
regulate all multinationals in the interest of other nations .3
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AFFECTING FOREIGN BUSINESS
ACTIVITY
Competition is the principal method by which the economy of the
United States is to accomplish the allocation of scarce resources and
to produce efficiently the goods and services desired by consumers.3 7
The Sherman Act, which has been described by the United States
Supreme Court as a "charter of freedom: with the generality and
36. The position of the United States government that control of multinational corporate
abuse beyond that which directly affects American interests is a subject for international
control and agreement was made by Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll in a
prepared statement made before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Govern-
ment of the Joint Economic Committee. Ingersoll, Department Proposes Two New Actions
to Deal With International Problem of Bribery, 74 Dsw'T STATE BULL. 412, 414 (1976): "We
think there are many advantages to a multinational approach which is based on international
agreement both as to the basic standards to be applied in international trade and investment
and the procedures to curtail corrupt practices. A coordinated action by exporting and im-
porting countries would be the only effective way to inhibit improper activities of this kind
internationally."
A consideration of international efforts to control and regulate the activities of multina-
tional corporations is generally beyond the scope of this article. However, attention has been
given to international control by such organizations as the United Nations. See UNrrE
NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, RE-
PORT ON SECOND SESSION, Doc. E/5782, E/C 10/16 (March 1976). See generally Rubin,
Developments in the Law and Institutions of International Economic Relations: The Multina-
tional Enterprise at Bay, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (1974). For reports of other international
efforts and national efforts at control of multinationals, see, e.g., Comment, Multinational
Undertakings and the European Communities, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 553 (1974); Ness, Brazil:
Local Equity Participation in Multinational Enterprises, 6 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 1017 (1974).
37. See generally REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 1-3 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Arr'v GEN. REp.].
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adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in institu-
tional provisions, ,38 along with the supplemental antitrust statutes,
provide the legal authority for the efforts of governmental agencies
to control business activity in order to produce an open and compet-
itive market. By their terms such antitrust statutes as the Sherman
and Clayton Acts apply expressly to foreign as well as interstate
commerce. 31 In a world economic system it is impossible to isolate
the activities of American firms in foreign commerce, just as in an
earlier day the United States Supreme Court found it impossible to
limit the effects of a single farmer to the state where he farmed from
its necessary impact on interstate commerce." As one commentator
has observed: "[I]t is almost impossible to disentangle the consid-
erations relevant to an entirely domestic setting from those relevant
to foreign activities affecting foreign commerce."'"
At present, the United States has four principal statutes which
regulate anticompetitive activity of multinational corporations: the
Sherman Act,42 the Clayton Act,43 the Webb-Pomerene Act,4" and
the Federal Trade Commission Act.45 Each of these acts will be
briefly considered and then a review will be made of the current
state of litigation being conducted under the United States antitrust
laws against companies engaged in business in the United States or
in business activities which affect the United States.
38. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970); id. § 12 et seq.
40. See Wicker v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), where the Supreme Court observed:
The effect of consumption of homegrown wheat on interstate commerce is due to
the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor in the disappearance of the
wheat crop....
It is well established by the decisions of this Court that the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that
commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices. One of the primary
purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat, and to
that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the market. It can hardly be
denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.
Id. at 127-28.
41. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 987 (1976); see E. KITNER &
M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER (1974). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-88 (1975); Comment, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: Professional
Legal Services and the Antitrust Laws, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 254, 262-65 (1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
43. Id. §§ 12-27.
44. Id. § 18.
45. Id. §§ 14-58.
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Survey of United States Antitrust Laws
1. The Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act of 189046 provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal
Section 1 does not attempt to define the types of conduct which
constitute a "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy" in
"restraint of trade." 7 Much of the Sherman Act language and prin-
ciples were taken from the common law rules governing restraint of
trade and monopolies.48 Courts have held that these terms must be
given the same general meaning and construction that they had
under the common law.49 The modifying term "every" has been
construed to mean unreasonable contract, combination, or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade. 0 Unreasonable restraints of trade have
been defined to include price-fixing,5' market division, 52 group boy-
cotts,5 3 tying arrangements," and reciprocal dealing.5 5 Violations of
sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act are denominated felonies
and currently carry sanctions of (1) a fine, not exceeding $1,000,000
for a corporation and up to $100,000 for a person; (2) imprisonment,
not exceeding three years; and (3) both fine and imprisonment."
46. Id. § 1.
47. See Hermann, Conspiracy, the Business Enterprise, White Collar Crime and Federal
Prosecution: A Primer for Practice, 9 CREIG HON L. REv. 647, 656-71 (1976).
48. See STICKELS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS: ANrrrUSw LAWS 2 (1972).
49. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
50. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
51. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
52. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), rev'g 319 F. Supp. 1031,
1043 (N.D. Ill. 1970); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
53. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc.
V. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
54. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S.
293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
55. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
56. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, § 3 (1974).
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.-7
This section of the Sherman Act has been construed to prohibit
actual monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and combinations
and conspiracies to monopolize."5 The three crimes specified in sec-
tion 2 have been held not mutually exclusive and a defendant's
action may violate all three proscriptions." It is not necessary that
actual monopolization be obtained or approached to find a section
2 violation; all that is needed is a showing of concerted action with
a specific intent to achieve monopolization of a substantial part of
commerce, plus some overt act in furtherance of such an effort. 0
2. The Clayton Act
The Clayton Act"' was passed in 1914 to supplement the Sherman
Act. Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce" to include
trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign na-
tions.2 A principal section of the Clayton Act which has significance
for multinational corporations is section 7 which prohibits commer-
cial corporate mergers "where in any line of commerce in any sec-
tion of the country, the effect may be substantially to lessen compe-
tition, or tend to create a monopoly. '6 3 In considering mergers be-
tween American firms and foreign firms doing business or poten-
tially doing business in the United States, the finding of a signifi-
cant anticompetitive effect in the United States market has been
held sufficient to prohibit the merger." While violation of section 7
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
58. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. E. 1. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
59. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946).
60. Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965);
see Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 395-97 (1905).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
62. Id. § 12.
63. Id. § 18.
64. United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per
curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). See generally Graham, Hermann & Marcus, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and Mergers Involving Foreign Intrests, 23 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1971).
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is not made a criminal offense, refusal to comply with a court order
which may require dissolution or divestiture will give rise to a con-
tempt order and could provide the basis for the imposition of sub-
stantial fines. Moreover, consolidations or agreements which can be
prosecuted under the Clayton Act may often be attacked under the
Sherman Act with the possible imposition of criminal sanctions.
3. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act65 enacted in 1914 created the
Federal Trade Commission and gave it power to prevent unfair
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce. The jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission over "unfair methods of competition" has been con-
strued to include all acts which are illegal under the other antitrust
laws.66 Moreover, Congress has further provided that the Federal
Trade Commission Act "shall be construed as extending to unfair
methods of competition used in export trade against competitors
engaged in export trade, even if the acts constituting such unfair
methods are done without the territorial jurisidiction of the United
States." 7 Violations of the antitrust laws, of section 5 of the FTC
Act, and of FTC "chase and desist orders" are denominated viola-
tions and the amended statute provides for the obtaining of a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 for unfair or deceptive practices that are
done with knowledge or implied knowledge. 8
4. The Webb-Pomerene Act
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 19189 provides in section 2 that noth-
ing in the Sherman Act
shall be construed as declaring to be illegal an association entered
for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade, and actually en-
gaged in such export trade, or an agreement made or act done in
the course of export trade by such association, provided such
association, agreement or act is not in restraint of trade within the
United States, and is not in restraint of the export trade of any
domestic competitor of such association.0
This Act provides a special exemption from the antitrust laws for
American firms which cooperate in export activity. These export
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
66. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 64 (1970).
68. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, § 205 (1974).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
70. Id.
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associations must be limited to American members; there is no
application of the Act to joint foreign investment.7' The Act does not
authorize any activities by merger or joint venture between Ameri-
can and foreign corporations which could restrain domestic export
commerce, nor does the Act exempt acts of American firms which
would constitute efforts to enhance or depress prices or substantially
lessen competition within the United States.7" Section 4 of the Act
provides for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission to include acts of unfair competition outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States which might be committed
by associations required to register with the FTC under section 5 of
the Act.7 3 Actions maintained by the FTC can result in the same
assessment of civil penalties as provided for domestic acts of unfair
or deceptive business practices.
Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws
Three theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction have been invoked
to legitimize the applications of United States antitrust laws to
American corporations' activity abroad and to foreign corporations
doing business in the United States. These include: (1) the terri-
torial principle, (2) the principle of power to regulate conduct which
has its effect within the territory of the prescribing nation, and (3)
the power of a nation to regulate the conduct of its own nationals.
Under the territorial principle, a nation may prescribe rules of law
attaching legal consequence to conduct occurring within its terri-
tory, whether or not the effect of that conduct falls within the terri-
tory.75 The territorial principle is the principle of law on which the
Congress is deemed to rely absent a specific indication of legislative
intent to apply the statutory prescriptions extraterritorially.5 A sec-
ond principle of extraterritoriality, which has been adopted by
American courts, provides that there is jurisdiction to proscribe
with respect to effects within the territory of the enforcing nation."
This "effects" jurisdiction is limited to cases where (1) the conduct
and the effect of that conduct are generally recognized as constitu-
ent elements of a crime, (2) the effect within the territory is substan-
71. See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
72. Pogue, Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 33 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1967).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1970).
74. See Comment, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1011 (1976).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
76. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
77. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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tial, and (3) the effect is a direct and forseeable result of the extra-
territorial conduct."8 A third principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction
provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law at-
taching legal consequences to conduct of its nationals wherever the
conduct occurs."9 A corporation is generally held to have the nation-
ality of the state which creates it;" any corporation chartered by a
state of the United States is deemed to be a national of the United
States and potentially subject to United States regulatory laws,
even though the specific conduct of the corporation which is at issue
occurs in a foreign country."s
1. Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act has been increasingly extended to parties and
acts outside the territorial limits of the United States so that now
domestic courts exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
over domestic corporations doing business abroad.82 Two principal
questions arise when domestic courts deal with international anti-
trust problems: (1) does the domestic court have jurisdiction, and
(2) did Congress intend an extraterritorial application of the statute
in question.8 3
Establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations has
been accomplished by the recognition of a corporation as a person
under the Sherman Act; section 8 of the Act provides that "person"
includes corporations established under foreign law.84 The com-
monly accepted test for determining personal jurisdiction within the
United States is followed in the case of suits brought against foreign
corporations; a federal court can exercise jurisdiction over such a
foreign entity if the corporation has such "minimum contacts" with
the forum that the maintenance of the suit does not offend tradi-
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
79. Id. at § 30.
80. Id. at § 27.
81. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
82. See Note, The Conflict of Laws and the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman
Act, 4 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 164, 169, (1972), citing ATT'Y GEN. REP., supra note 37, at 76,
which suggested that the Sherman Act applied to any combination between United States
nationals or between a United States national and a foreigner which had a sufficiently
substantial anticompetitive effect on trade with foreign nations so as to constitute an
unreasonable restraint; and, secondly, that the Act should be applied to conspiracies be-
tween foreign competitors where there was both intention and effect resulting in substantial
anticompetitive impact on United States foreign commerce. See also Fortenberry,
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations-Paths through the Great Grimpen
Mire, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 519 (1971).
83. See Fugate, An Overview of Antitrust Enforcement and the Multinational
Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1973).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970).
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tional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice. 5 The
"minimum contacts" test has been liberally applied so that courts
are satisfied with "relatively few acts of 'doing business'. ' 8
Just as courts have extended the concept of in personam jurisdic-
tion, the federal courts have found the reach of the Sherman Act to
extend beyond the territorial limits of the United States. 7 In the
earliest cases, the United States Supreme Court limited application
of the Sherman Act by strict application of the territorial principle. 8
Justice Holmes, for instance, observed in the first Sherman Act case
involving foreign commerce that "the general and almost universal
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the Law of the country where the act is done
" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court soon determined that
there was jurisdiction over foreign defendants entering into combi-
nations or agreements which affected American markets." For in-
stance, in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.9 the Court declared a
conspiracy to monopolize United States foreign commerce ' illegal
while emphasizing the fact that not only were there unlawful results
in the United States, but also that there were acts done pursuant
to the agreement in the United States by a foreign corporation, or
pursuant to an agreement with a domestically incorporated com-
pany.
The contemporary approach of American courts has shifted the
emphasis from the territorial principle requiring that anticompeti-
tive acts within the United States be proven, to application of the
Sherman Act to restrictive agreements which affect domestic Amer-
ican commercial markets." In United States v. Timkin Roller Bear-
ing Co.,93 it was held that restrictive agreements made in foreign
countries by a domestic corporation with two of its independent
foreign subsidiaries were violative of the Sherman Act. The district
court observed that "the fact that the cartel arrangements were
made on foreign soil does not relieve defendant from responsibility
... . [T]hey had a direct influencing effect on trade in tapered
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
86. Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972).
87. See generally Comment, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Con-
flict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (1976).
88. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
89. Id. at 356.
90. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Pac.
& Arctic Ry. and Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
91. 247 U.S. 268 (1927).
92. United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
93. 83 F. Supp. 284, (E.D. Ohio 1949), modified on appeal, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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bearings between the United States and foreign countries."'" The
Supreme Court not only treated the wholly owned foreign subsidiar-
ies as independent entities for purposes of satisfying the plurality
requirements of the Sherman Act, but refused to accept the argu-
ment that the pressures of foreign trade required collusive activity:
This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sherman
Act against restraints of foreign trade are based on the assumption,
and reflect the policy, that competition in both export and import
...is both possible and desirable. Those provisions of the Act are
wholly inconsistent with appellants' argument that American
business must be left free to participate in international cartels,
that free foreign commerce in goods must be sacrificed in order to
foster export of American dollars for investment in foreign factories
which sell abroad.9 5
The adoption of the "effects" test by the Supreme Court has
resulted in very extended extraterritorial application of the Sher-
man Act. In United States v. Aluminum Company of America,9" the
court noted that the United States can impose its antitrust laws
upon persons not within its borders for conduct outside its borders
which has consequences within its borders. The court concluded
that where there is (1) intent to affect imports or exports of the
United States, and (2) an anticompetitive effect, the Sherman Act
may be applied to foreign corporations." Moreover, the effect of
concern to the United States does not necessarily occur directly
within the United States; the division of foreign markets can consti-
tute conduct in violation of the Sherman Act." Finally, the agree-
ment to affect the United States market may be confined to foreign
firms. Nevertheless, there will be liability if there is injury in the
United States in the form of higher prices in the business conducted
by agents or subsidiaries of the foreign firms."
2. Extraterritorial Application of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition by one
corporation "engaged in commerce" of "another corporation en-
gaged also in commerce," if the acquisition may substantially lessen
competition "in any line of commerce in any section of the coun-
94. 83 F. Supp. at 309.
95. 341 U.S. at 599.
96. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
97. Id. at 443-44.
98. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
99. United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1965 Trade
Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y.).
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try.""' " Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce" as includ-
ing "trade or commerce with foreign nations."'' The Clayton Act
requires only that the anticompetitive effects be felt within "a sec-
tion of the country"; the merger, consolidation, or joint venture
causing the prohibited effect does not need to occur within the geo-
graphical territory of the United States.'"2 The language of section
7 which restricts its applications to "corporations engaged in com-
merce" does not exclude foreign mergers involving the foreign sub-
sidiary of an American firm and a foreign firm.'0 3 Furthermore, judi-
cial construction of the Clayton Act has extended section 7 to cover
corporations which are "potential" competitors. The Supreme
Court has held that competition might be substantially lessened
even if only one company would have entered the market while the
other company would have remained an important potential com-
petitor on the edge of the market.' 4
Few section 7 suits to date have been brought against mergers and
joint ventures involving foreign firms,' 5 although nothing in the
current policy of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission precludes such suits in the future. As early as 1964, the
Department of Justice employed section 7 as part of its attack on
the establishment and operation of the Mobay Chemical Co., a joint
venture involving two of the world's largest chemical companies,
one foreign and one domestic.'00 In 1965, the United States success-
fully challenged the merger of Schlitz Brewing Company, a domes-
tic firm, and General Brewing Co., the United States subsidiary of
John Labatt, Ltd., a Canadian corporation. The gravaman of the
complaint was the elimination of the potential competition of the
foreign competitor.' 7 In a 1970 case involving two Swiss chemical
companies, a consent decree was entered which required divestiture
of United States subsidiaries of the two merging foreign corpora-
100. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
101. Id. § 12.
102. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
103. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
Graham, Marcus & Hermann, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Mergers Involving Foreign
Interests, 23 STAN. L. R v. 205 (1972).
104. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Corp. 378 U.S. 158, decision on remand. 246 F.
Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
105. See, e.g., United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,269 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent
decree).
106. United States v. Monsanto Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,001, at 83,553 (W.D. Pa.)
(consent decree).
107. United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd
per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
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tions.'1 Although foreign companies have been involved in the
above cited cases and others, all cases in which the United States
has challenged an acquisition as unlawful have been cases in which
either the acquiring or acquired company was a domestic firm or a
foreign concern's operating subsidiary doing business in the United
States. To date, there are no reported cases involving a joint venture
or a merger between foreign firms transacting no business in the
United States, either directly or through significant subsidiaries.
3. Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the Webb-Pomerene Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is supplemented by section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act which gives it jurisdiction over un-
fair trade practices.'"9 Through the Webb-Pomerene Act, section 4,
the provisions of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act are
applicable to "unfair methods of competition used in export trade
against competitors engaged in export trade even though the acts
. . .are done without the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.""' 0 The broad discretion found to reside in the FTC in the
application of section 5,'" means that the Commission is largely free
to fashion bases for action and to develop appropriate relief for
anticompetitive practices in the export trade. The far reach of the
FTC's jurisdiction can be seen in Branch v. FTC,I" where the Com-
mission's finding of unfair trade practices based on the defendant's
misleading advertising in South America was upheld on the basis
that the FTC's action was to protect the defendant's United States
competitors, not the consumers in South America.
4. Conflicts of Laws Problems and Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Law
The extraterritorial application of antitrust laws can create very
serious problems in the area of conflicts of national laws. These
problems are well illustrated by the aftermath of the district court
decree in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. "3 The
court had found that Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI) and
108. United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas., 73,269 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent decree).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
110. Id. § 64.
111. See Atl. Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357(1965). See also FTC v. Colgate & Co.,
310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962).
112. 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
113. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.), 105 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., [19521 2 All E.R. 780, final judgment, [1954] 2 All E.R. 88.
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others had through the use of patent licenses divided world markets.
The district court ordered ICI to license United States parties and
to grant immunity to British users of the patent. British Nylon
Spinners sued in the English court to protect their exclusive patent
licensing agreement with ICI and to prevent ICI from complying
with the American decree. The British court held that comity did
not require acceptance of the United States court decree which im-
paired British contract rights of a party-British Nylon-not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the American court. The American judg-
ment was viewed as an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction that
British courts would not recognize.
Some efforts at international cooperation in administering do-
mestic antitrust laws have been joined by the United States.", In
1967 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), a treaty organization made up of nineteen European coun-
tries, Canada, Japan, and the United States, recommended areas
for international cooperation in antitrust problems." 5 These recom-
mendations covered three problem areas: (1) advance notification
of actions to be taken by one country under its antitrust laws which
could affect the interests of another country; (2) coordination of
enforcement policies of national states; and (3) exchange of infor-
mation on restrictive business practices to the extent permissible
under national law." 6
Since 1950 the United States has negotiated a number of bilateral
agreements affecting extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
These treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Nicaragua, and Pakistan contain general clauses on restric-
tive business practices exemplified by the terms of the Italian agree-
ment:
The two High Contracting Parties agree that business practices
which restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster mono-
polistic control, and which are engaged in or made effective by one
114. O.E.C.D. Doc. c(67) 53 (October 10, 1967).
115. Suggestions have been made for international agreements to regulate multinational
corporations and thus avoid the conflicts of laws problems created by such cases as Imperial
Chemical. See, e.g., Market, Recent Developments in International Antitrust Cooperation,
13 ANTITRUST BULL. 355, 359 (1968). For descriptions of current United States efforts to
develop conflicts of laws principles for avoiding the problem of unenforceable judgments, see
Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate
and International Law, 65 YAE L.J. 1087, 1156 (1956) and Trawtman, The Role of Conflicts
Thinking in Refining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIo
ST. L.J. 586, 617 (1961).
116. See note 114 supra.
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or more private or public commercial enterprises or by combina-
tion, agreement or other agreement among public or private com-
mercial enterprises may have harmful effects upon the commerce
between their respective territories. Accordingly, each High
Contracting Party agrees to consult with respect to any such prac-
tices and to take such measures as it deems appropriate with a
view to eliminating such harmful effects."'
In general, the United States has one of the most developed and
widely applicable antitrust policies in the world. Through consulta-
tion and treaty, efforts are made to coordinate United States en-
forcement efforts with the policies and official activities of foreign
governments. Nevertheless, the enforcement of United States anti-
trust laws with the possibility of criminal sanction provides one of
the most potent legal devices for the United States to control the
activities of American based firms and to compel adherence to the
basic public policy of the United States which is embodied in the
doctrine of competition and open markets. The experience with the
extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws pro-
vides a model or analogy which can serve as a reference in consider-
ing the application of other economic regulatory laws with attend-
ant criminal sanctions to American based multinational corpora-
tions.
UNITED STATES PROPOSED LAWS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF
BRIBES AND CORRUPT OVERSEAS PAYMENTS
By mid-year 1976, some eighty-four American companies ac-
knowledged making bribes or paying sales commissions to obtain
contracts in foreign countries."' Initial disclosures were authenti-
cated in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
its Subcommittee on Multinationals."' This in turn gave rise to
hearings before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee.2 0 These hearings and general public concern resulted in
117. Treaty with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. XVIII, 3, 63 Stat. 2255, T.LA.S. No. 1965
(effective July 26, 1949).
118. Repeal of Laws Aiding Multinationals Sought, 34 CONG. Q. 1026 (1976). For reaction
typical of the business community, see Guzzardi, An Unscandalized View of Those "Bribes"
Abroad, FORTUNE, July, 1976 at 118; Nehemkis, Business Payoffs Abroad: Rhetoric and
Reality, 18 CAUF. MGT. REV. 5 (1975). For typical reaction of the legal community, see
Murphy, Payoffs to Foreign Officials: Time for More National Responsibility, 62 A.B.A.J. 480
(1976); Solomon & Linville, Transnational Conduct of American Multinational Corporations:
Questionable Payments Abroad, 17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 303 (1976); Kane & Butler,
Improper Corporate Payments: The Second Half of Watergate, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 1 (1976).
119. See Multinational Corporations and Foreign Policy, supra note 1, at pt. 12.
120. See Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes and on Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign
Officials Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
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the introduction of a number of bills in the Senate in the last Con-
gress which characteristically provided two distinct approaches to
the problem of bribes and corrupt payments to foreign officials: (1)
the development of additional reporting requirements,' and (2) the
development of new criminal prohibitions directed at preventing the
payment of bribes to foreign officials. 2 In addition, the Securities
and Exchange Commission prepared a special study on the problem
of corrupt payments'23 and the President appointed a special Task
Force headed by then Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson to
study the problem of bribes to foreign officials.' The following sec-
tion will deal first with pending congressional proposals and second
with the reports of the SEC and the Special Presidential Task
Force.
Proposed Congressional Measures to Deal With Bribes and Corrupt
Payments to Foreign Officials
Legislative proposals submitted to the Senate last year provided
several approaches for dealing with the problem of bribes and cor-
rupt payments to foreign officials; these included: (1) the estab-
lishment of special reporting requirements;'25 (2) the establishment
of criminal sanctions for bribes and corrupt payments; 2 ' (3) the
requirement of special audit committees to be established by do-
mestic corporations;' and (4) the removal of benefits to taxpayers
from special treatment of foreign earnings where there is proof of
payments to foreign officials. 2 ' Congressional consideration of this
problem resulted in the Senate passing of S. 3664'2 which was re-
ported out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Seas. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Prohibiting Bribes].
121. See, e.g., S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
122. See, e.g., S. 3379, 94th Cong., 2d Seass. (1976); S. 3151, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
See also S. 3150, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976), which would have denied tax benefits to those
making bribes or other illegal payments to foreign government agents or officials.
123. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as the REPORT OF THE
SEC], reprinted in [1976] 353 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA).
124. 10 Named by Ford to Review Bribes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1976, at 43, col. 6. For a
reprint of the preliminary report of the Task Force headed by former Secretary of Commerce
Elliot Richardson, see Appendix to Hearings on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 120, at 39-67.
125. See S. 3379, §§ 3,4,6.
126. See id. § 3.
127. See id. § 8.
128. See S. 3150; S. 3379, § 7.
129. S. 3664 was passed by the Senate on September 15, 1976, without amendments and
was reported to the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on September 16,
1976.
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Urban Affairs.'" S. 3379 introduced by Senator Church and others'3 '
and S. 3133 introducted by Senator Proxmire' 31 best exemplify the
alternative approaches of reporting, and the application of criminal
sanctions which were considered by the last Congress. These latter
bills will first be described; then the compromise bill, S. 3664 which
was passed by the Senate, will be considered at some length.
S. 3133, as introduced by Senator Proxmire, would have author-
ized the SEC to issue regulations requiring issuers of registered
securities to keep accurate books and records.' 3  It would have re-
quired such issuers to report to the SEC all payments in excess of
$1000 to foreign officials, political parties, or sales agents retained
in connection with obtaining business from, or influencing legisla-
tion or regulations of, a foreign government regardless of any corrupt
purpose.'14 Further, the bill specifically would have prohibited the
use of the mails or any means of interstate commerce, and would
have authorized the SEC to prosecute such use of the mails or
interstate commerce to offer or to pay a bribe, or to make a corrupt
payment to influence legislation, regulation or to obtain business.' 35
S. 3379, as introduced by Senator Church and others, would have
required issuers of registered securities to file with the SEC reports
describing foreign political contributions, payments to foreign offi-
cials intended to influence their decisions, and payments to busi-
nessmen intended to influence their business decisions.' 3 Further,
this bill provided for an annual foreign policy analysis by the State
Department on foreign policy implications of questionable pay-
ments.' 37 The proposed legislation provided for disclosure of infor-
mation relating to these payments directly to investors and would
have amended the Internal Revenue Code to eliminate deductions
for illegal payments.'38 Further, this bill would have required com-
panies to establish audit committees made up of outside directors
who would review the corporate accounts and identify payments
made to foreign officials and agents.'39 The bill also would have
130. See S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
131. S. 3379 was introduced by Senator Church (for himself and Senators Clark and
Pearson) on May 5, 1976 and referred to the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, and Foreign Relations.
132. S. 3133 was introduced by Senator Proxmire on March 11, 1976, and referred to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
133. S. 3133, § 1.
134. Id. § 2.
135. Id. § 3.
136. Id. §§ 3-4.
137. Id. § 5.
138. Id. § 7.
139. Id. § 8.
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authorized the President to seek international agreements to inhibit
improper payments. 4 " Finally, S. 3379 would have created new pri-
vate rights of action by shareholders or competitors injured by the
payment of bribes.' This bill did not provide, however, for the
imposition of criminal sanctions for the giving of bribes.
S. 3664, which was reported out by the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs and passed by the Senate, is the legis-
lative proposal from the last Congress most likely to receive favor-
able action by the new Congress. It was a hybrid bill which com-
bined the approaches of the bills offered by Senators Proxmire and
Church and also reflected the content of the SEC report discussed
below.' This bill under its first section would require companies
registered with the SEC under section 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193 4 13 and companies required to report under section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 44 (1) to develop and
maintain accurate books and records; (2) to develop and maintain
accounting controls to assure that transactions will be executed in
accordance with management's instructions, and will be accurately
reported and audited; and (3) to be subject to criminal sanction for
falsification of books, records, accounts, or documents, or for decep-
tive disclosures to an accountant in connection with an audit.'45
Section 2 of the proposed legislation provides for the criminal
sanctioning of corrupt payments to foreign public officials. "' This
section of S. 3664 applies to companies registered with or reporting
to the SEC.'47 The bill applies the existing criminal penalties of the
securities laws, up to two years imprisonment and a fine of up to
$10,000, for payments, promises of payment, or authorization of
payment of anything of value to any foreign official, political party,
candidate for office, or intermediary, where there is a corrupt pur-
140. Id. § 11.
141. Id. §§ 9-10.
142. See note 123 supra.
143. S. 3664, § 1. Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires a registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission of any security other than those specially
exempted, which are traded on a national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
144. S. 3664, § 1. Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires issuers
using interstate commerce to effect transactions to file a registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970).
145. S. 3664, § 1.
146. Id. § 2.
147. This section applies to all issuers required to file reports pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
78o(d) (1970) on the basis of their use of the mails or any instrument of interstate commerce
to corruptly offer to pay or promise to pay any official or agent of a foreign government in
order to obtain the use of his influence, or to cause him to fail to fulfill any official duty or to
obtain business opportunities with the foreign government in which the official holds an office
or has authority.
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pose. "' The corrupt purpose must be to induce the recipient to use
his influence to direct business to any person, to influence legisla-
tion or regulations, or to direct business to any person, to influence
legislation or regulations, or fail to perform any official function in
order to influence business decisions, legislation, or regulations, or
a government.' The use of the word "corruptly" is derived from the
domestic law prohibiting bribery'5 ° and connotes an evil motive or
purpose; it indicates an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the
recipient. This section does not require that the act be fully consum-
mated or successful in producing the desired outcome.'5 '
Section 3 of S. 3664 applies the identical prohibitions and penal-
ties provided by section 2 to any domestic business concern other
than one subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC pursuant to section
2. This would then apply to any company incorporated in the
United States and to any subsidiary of a company incorporated in
the United States' 51 since by definition such companies would be
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce which establishes the
jurisdiction for federal regulation.' 53 Violations of section 3 would be
investigated and prosecuted by the Justice Department while the
violation of section 2 would be investigated by the SEC, but prose-
cuted by the Justice Department.') 4
This proposed legislation would not reach small gratuities to ex-
pedite shipments or to receive needed customs permits.'55 For exam-
ple, payments made to expedite proper performance of duties would
not be reached by this legislation. Nor would this legislation reach
all corrupt payments overseas which might benefit American com-
148. S. 3664, § 3(b).
149. See S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 608 (1976).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1970), which provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value
to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers
or promises any public official or any person who has been selected to be a public
official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent-
(1) to influence any official act; or
(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be
a public official to commit or aid in commiting, or collude in, or allow, any
fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United
States; or
(3) to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to
be a public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty.
151. See United States v. Kemmel, 188 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 712
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 988 (1962).
152. S. 3664, § 3.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
154. See S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1976).
155. Id. at 6.
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panies. Cases of foreign nationals who pay bribes overseas acting
entirely on their own initiative would not be reached by this law.,'
Nevertheless, the report of the SEC to the Senate Banking Commit-
tee showed that in most cases involving bribes attributable to
American-controlled companies or their agents, some responsible
official or employee of the United States parent company had
knowledge of the bribery and approved the practice.' 7 This legisla-
tion would permit the prosecution of such corporate employees, and
accepted legal doctrines such as aiding and abetting and joint par-
ticipation would provide a broad prosecutorial reach under this
law. 58
As this review of S. 3664 suggests, the bill combines a broadening
of disclosure requirements and the adoption of a criminal sanction
for bribing conduct. The disclosure approach, in addition to drawing
on public opinion and investor pressures as policing devices, also
permits the penalizing of failures to report and misreporting. The
inclusion of a criminal sanction for bribery permits the widest possi-
bility of deterrence of the practice of corrupt payments. The current
SEC investigation powers and practices without threat of criminal
sanction have in fact produced a large number of disclosures and
have resulted in cooperation with the SEC.' 9 The additional threat
of prosecution by the Department of Justice for the making of cor-
rupt payments should further assist in the elimination of these prac-
tices.'10
The experience with the extraterritorial application of the securi-
ties laws indicates that so long as foreign conduct produced
domestic harm and so long as the defendant is engaged in domestic
commerce, the securities laws apply. 6' The essential question has
been the congressional intent with regard to the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the domestic law.' There can be no question that the
intent of S. 3664 is to provide the court with jurisdiction over United
156. Id. at 7.
157. REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 123, at 41.
158. S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
159. REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 123, at 6-13.
160. See testimony of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in Hearings on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 120, at 6.
161. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev d on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Manly v. Shoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
See also Bersh v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914
(1975). See generally Jones, An Interest Analysis Approach to Extraterritorial Application of
Rule lob-5, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 983 (1974); Nate, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976).
162. See, e.g., Bersh v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 914 (1975).
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States companies and their agents who engage in corrupt payments
to foreign officials.'
Reports of the SEC and the Special Task Force on Illegal Foreign
Payments
On May 12, 1976, the Securities Exchange Commission submitted
a report to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Com-
mittee.' 4 This report with testimony from commissioners of the
SEC was available prior to the reporting out of S. 3664 and its
influence is apparent on the text of the proposed legislation. 6 ' The
SEC found the practice of foreign bribery to be extensive; reports
were cited of at least 100 companies having engaged in such prac-
tices.'66 Further, it was reported that the effect of these corrupt
payments was debilitating on public confidence in American busi-
ness.'67 While the SEC expressed confidence in its present disclosure
program, it did urge passage of a three-part legislative program to:
(1) specifically prohibit and penalize the falsification of corporate
records which should reflect payments to foreign officials; (2) pro-
hibit and punish corporate officials or agents who make false state-
ments to auditors; and (3) require that corporations develop inde-
pendent auditing systems in accord with generally accepted ac-
counting principles.'68 The SEC specifically recommended amend-
ments to S. 3133 as introduced by Senator Proxmire.' 9 These
amendments suggested by the SEC would require the keeping of
books and records which accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
tions and disposition of assets of American companies and would
require them to develop an internal system of internal accounting
control.'7 The SEC proposal would not require that the identity of
foreign persons to whom payments are made be part of the necessary
reporting."'
163. See S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
164. REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 123.
165. See S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
166. REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 123, at 37.
167. Id. at 54.
168. Id. at 58-59. See also Kane & Butler, Improper Corporate Payments: The Second
Half of Watergate, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 1 (1976).
169. REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 123, at 60-66.
170. Id. at 63-64.
171. Id. at 60, where the Report reads:
Similarly, we are reluctant to see imposed a hard-and-fast rule requiring every
reporting corporate issuer, in every instance, to identify the recipients of their
foreign payments. In some cases, disclosure of the identity of the person receiving
such payments may be important to an investor's understanding of the transaction.
More frequently, however, the identity of a particular foreign government employee
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The SEC urged that there be a prohibition and prosecution for the
affirmative making of false statements and the omission of entries
which would be "material," i.e., information useful to a reasonably
prudent investor, under general SEC reporting requirements.' Fur-
ther, such false statements or omissions of material information in
connection with the required independent audit would also be pen-
alized. "3
The SEC has thus urged the enactment of reporting and disclo-
sure requirements for payments to foreign officials."' Rather than
offering specific guidelines for necessary reporting, it has urged the
continued use of its "material" disclosure requirement as developed
in domestic securities reporting. In a sense the SEC would augment
the requirements which are viewed as "material" to a reasonable
investor by including the requirement of reporting of significant
payments to foreign officials and politicians which are designed to
influence legislation, regulation or to obtain business.'
A special Cabinet Level Group was appointed by President Ford
on March 31, 1976, to study foreign payoffs and to suggest policy
steps to eliminate these abuses. This Task Force was headed by
Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson and included in its ten
who received the payment may have little or no significance to the investor. In
addition to our desire to see the Commission's flexibility preserved, we are also
cognizant of the fact that, as our experience to date demonstrates, in many in-
stances corporations are unable to verify their initial pronouncements concerning
the recipients of these types of payments.
172. Id. at 64, providing in the proposed amendment to § 13(b)(4) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1970): "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly: (A) to make, or cause to be made, a materially false or misleading
statement, or (B) to omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state any material fact
necessary in order to make statements made in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading. ... The term "material" has been defined by the Securities
Exchange Commission to include that information which a reasonably prudent investor rea-
sonably ought to know before buying a security. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230-408, 240, 12b-20, 240, 14(a)-
9(a) (1976). See Fiet v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). The federal courts have construed this information to be "facts which have an impor-
tant bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation or its business." Escott
v. Ban Chris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In applying the test
of "materiality" to issuing corporations for instance, one court held that the issuer must
disclose any "fact" which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value
of the corporation's stock or securities." Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.
1963). While S. 3664 would require report of all payments, it is not at all unlikely that the
requiring of reporting of all material information, in fact of this broad construction of the term
"material" would not in fact include the reporting of all bribes or payments to foreign offi-
cials. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that the SEC proposal limited to material facts
would not be as inclusive as the coverage provided in S. 3664.
173. REPORT OF THE SEC, supra note 123, at 64.
174. Id. at 57-59.
175. Id. at 66.
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person membership, Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of the
Treasury Simon, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Attorney Gen-
eral Levi. A preliminary report of the Task Force on Questionable
Corporate Payments Abroad was made to the Senate Banking Com-
mittee on June 11, 1976.' The Richardson report calls for legisla-
tion which would not include a specific prohibition of and penalty
for bribes or payments to foreign officials or politicians; the justifi-
cation given for the exclusion of criminal penalization is the diffi-
culty of regulating and penalizing acts committed abroad. 7 1 In-
stead, the Task Force proposes a special disclosure requirement and
prosecution for failure to disclose. United States corporations
abroad would be required to report all payments in excess of some
floor amount, made directly or indirectly to any person employed
by or representing a foreign government or to any foreign political
party or candidate for foreign political office in connection with
obtaining or maintaining business with, or influencing the conduct
of a foreign government.'79 The Task Force would require a report
of the amount of such payments, its purpose, and the name of the
recipient.1s°
The Task Force would have these reports made to an executive
department such as the Departments of Commerce or State and not
the SEC.'8' The Task Force report took the position that the SEC
efforts should be to protect investors and that reporting to the SEC
should be limited to material information; thus the SEC ought to
be confined in its reporting requirements "to those matters as to
which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be in-
formed."'8 2 The suggestion of the Task Force is that all significant
foreign payments require reporting and that such a reporting re-
quirement would avoid the difficult problem of defining what is
meant by a "bribe."'I' The requirement of reporting all payments
above a certain amount leaves those bribes or corrupt payments
made below that amount unreported; this has given rise to criticism
of the Task Force recommendations.'8 4 Moreover, in suggesting that
176. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1976, at 43, col. 6.
177. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS 139-67 (1976), reprinted in the Appendix to Hearings on Prohibit-
ing Bribes, supra note 120 [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE].
178. Id. at 61.
179. Id. at 63.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 52-56.
183. Id. at 62.
184. Id. at 10-11.
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reports of these payments be made to a specially identified execu-
tive department, the preliminary report has given rise to criticism
that such an arrangement can too easily lead to suppression of infor-
mation or "coverup" by an executive department and would involve
duplication of agency and department ability to obtain and analyze
reports made."5
The Task Force would provide the Department of State with dis-
cretion to convey the contents of payments reports to affected gov-
ernments and would, after the interval of a year or so, make these
reports available to the public.' This would allow foreign official
action prior to any public controversy created by the release of
reports. 7
The requirements of reporting foreign payments suggested by the
Task Force would apply to all American business entities and to
foreign subsidiaries they control.'88 The Task Force suggestion is
that penalties for failure to report should apply only to United
States parent corporations and their officers, thus avoiding the
problem of extraterritorial application of United States criminal
sanctions.' The criminal penalty for negligent or willful failure to
report would be set at a fine up to $10,000, or imprisonment up to
five years, or both. 90
The Task Force report would impose no penalty under United
States law for the making of a bribe or a corrupt payment abroad;"'
in a sense, the domestic corporation would gain immunity from
domestic prosecution by making a proper report of the questionable
payment. However, the availability of these reports to foreign gov-
ernments," 2 at the discretion of the State Department, would
present serious prospects of foreign prosecution.
CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS SUBVERSIVE OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
In March and April of 1973, the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held
hearings on the role and influence of multinational corporations in
185. S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1976).
186. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, supra note 177, at 64.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 63.
189. Id. at 64.
190. This is the current penalty set for making false statements to any agency or depart-
ment of the United States government in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
191. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, supra note 177, at 62.
192. Id. at 64.
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the shaping of American foreign policy.'93 Specifically, the Senate
subcommittee investigated allegations that the International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. (ITT) sought to enlist the cooperation of
the United States government in preventing the election of Dr. Sal-
vador Allende Gossens as President of Chile in 1970, and in encour-
aging his downfall after his election."4 The hearings focused on
meetings and conversations between ITT and the CIA and other
government officials where possibilities for creating an economic
crisis in Chile were discussed.' 5 Evidence was received of an ITT
offer of up to $1,000,000 to the United States government in support
of anti-Allende activities.'96 Further, testimony was obtained which
indicated that there were efforts on the part of ITT to enlist the aid
of other multinational corporations.'97
The congressional response to the evidence developed in the Sen-
ate hearings was further investigation of the CIA and an effort to
develop monitoring controls through congressional oversight com-
mittees. 18 As to the control of multinational corporations, bills have
been introduced, and one has passed the Senate, which would pro-
vide for the reporting of transactions to and the gathering of infor-
mation by the Department of Commerce.'99 Typical of the bills in-
troduced was that presented by Senator Church to the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations and Commerce, S. 3151, which was
introduced on March 16, 1970.00 This bill would require domesti-
cally incorporated companies not only to supply information about
the general level of business activity, but also to report all expendi-
tures made in foreign countries.210 Specifically, the bill would re-
quire reports to the Secretary of Commerce of: (1) the amount of
total direct investment; (2) the amount of gross sales; (3) employ-
193. Hearings on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: The In-
ternational Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-1971, Part I and Part II
Before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 93rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973).
194. Id., Part I, at 4-53, reprinting testimony of William R. Merriam, a representative for
international trade of ITT.
195. Id., Part I, at 59-357.
196. Id., Part I, at 92-121, reprinting testimony of John A. McCone, director of ITT and
former director of the CIA; id., Part I, at 244-60, reprinting testimony of William V. Broe,
Director of Clandestine Services for the Western Hemisphere, CIA.
197. Id., Part I, at 263-76, reprinting testimony of William E. Quigley, Vice-Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Anaconda Co.
198. See, e.g., Hearings on the Activities of Multinational Corporations A broad Before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
199. See, e.g., S. 2839, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3151, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
200. S. 3151 was introduced by Senator Frank Church on March 16, 1976.
201. Id. § 4.
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ment data showing the number of employees and the level of com-
pensation for both American and foreign employees; (4) the amount
expended on research and development; (5) the name and location
and nature of activity of each foreign affiliate; and (6) "the dollar
amount of all expenditures made in the United States or in foreign
countries . . . directly or indirectly through any agent or pursuant
to any contractual arrangement. '20 2 The Secretary of Commerce
would be required to make regular publication of these statistics.0 3
Failure to report or falsification of reports could be punished by a
fine of up to $10,000, or by impgisonment for one year, or both. 20'
A similar bill, S. 2839, was reported to the Senate by the Commit-
tee on Commerce and passed by the Senate on May 18, 1976.205 This
bill included the general information required in the bill introduced
by Senator Church. The bill would require that reports be made by
United States business enterprises and their affiliates to a depart-
ment designated by the President. The reports would include: (1)
the location, nature and amount of investment in affiliates; (2)
balance sheets of parent and affiliates; (3) employment data; (4)
amount paid in taxes; and (5) the amount spent on research and
development. The bill grants discretionary authority to the Secre-
taries of Commerce and Treasury to collect data and conduct sur-
veys of financial activities of multinational companies.20, Because
the bill would not specifically require that all payments to foreign
officials or agents be reported, as in the Church proposal, it elimi-
nates the chief basis for discovery of efforts of United States compa-
nies to overtly or covertly affect foreign governments. It does, how-
ever, provide for a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment of natural
persons up to a year or both for failure to report. 20 7
There are no congressional proposals pending which would impose
criminal sanctions on domestic corporations or their affiliates or any
of their employees for acts subversive to foreign governments in
nations where they do business. Nor is there any proposal to pro-
hibit corporate cooperation with government agencies or prevent
corporate activity to instigate efforts of United States government
agencies which would be subversive of foreign governments.
The Department of State has taken the position that United
States companies must obey the laws of host countries and refrain
202. Id.
203. Id. § 5.
204. Id. § 8.
205. S. 2839, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
206. Id. § 2.
207. Id. § 6.
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from unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of host countries.
This position was strongly made by then Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger in a speech before the United Nations on September
1,1 975.208 Kissinger urged recognition of the economic benefits of
multinational corporations while declaring that the United States
will continue to seek cooperation with foreign governments to assure
that all corporations obey the laws of host countries and remain
clear of subversive activities.209 Kissinger urged that all host nations
treat enterprises equitably and without discrimination and that all
governments create conditions which will ensure that contracts are
negotiated openly and fairly.2 0 '
Deputy Secretary of State, Robert S. Ingersoll, appeared before
the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Committee on March 5, 1976.211 At that time Inger-
soll announced that the United States is now proposing a multilat-
eral agreement on corrupt practices of corporations.2 2 This treaty
would apply to international trade and investment transactions
with governments and would apply equally to those who offer or
make improper payments and to those who request or accept them.
This multilateral agreement would obligate host or importing gov-
ernments: (1) to establish clear guidelines concerning the use of
agents in connection with government procurement and other cov-
ered transactions; and (2) to establish appropriate criminal penal-
ties for bribery and extortion by enterprises and officials., While
this proposed multilateral treaty would only deal with corrupt fin-
ancial practices which undermine the integrity of host governments,
the type of cooperation which could follow from this area would
serve as a model for cooperation in dealing with other illegal and
subversive activities of multinational companies.2 4
For the most part, the United States is prepared to leave the
enforcement of host country criminal laws and prosecutions of sub-
versive activity to the country in which the criminal acts occur or
which are affected by criminal activity. 25 The Report of the Presi-
208. Kissinger, Global Consensus and Economic Development, 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 425-
41 (1975).
209. Id. at 432-33.
210. Id. at 433.
211. Ingersoll, Department Proposes Two New Actions to Deal With International Prob-
lem of Bribery, 74 DErr. STATE BuLL. 412-15 (1976).
212. Id. at 414.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 415.
215. Leigh, The Challenge of Transnational Corporate "Wrongdoing" to the Rule of Law,
74 DErT. STATE BULL. 642-47 (1976).
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dential Task Force suggested the propriety of endorsement of a
"code of conduct for multinational corporations" established by
multilateral agreement which would go beyond prohibiting bribes
and corrupt payments to specially establish that multinational cor-
porations should "abstain from any improper involvement in local
political activities."2"6 Nevertheless, the United States recognition
of extraterritorial application of criminal and regulatory laws does
provide a basis for host country prosecution. By exercise of in
personam jurisdiction and the invocation of extradition treaties
with the United States, all nations have the basis for the enforce-
ment of their laws against corporations which the United States
recognizes as obligated to conform to local laws of the host country.
CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen the rise of a growing concern about the
activities of American based multinational corporations and their
effects on revenue, capital movements, and labor. At the same time,
the activities of American corporations operating abroad directly, or
indirectly through subsidiaries, have created a concern about the
effect of the activities on the competitive market, investor confid-
ence, and American foreign policy. The use of criminal sanctions
against corporations in order to compel compliance with American
laws and public policy is one fully recognized in domestic law. More-
over, the extension of enforcement of regulatory law and laws having
penal sanctions through extraterritorial application of American
laws has been progressively broadened to the point that conduct
resulting in direct and forseeable consequences has been deemed
subject to American regulatory and penal laws.
The most developed area of American law providing a basis for
control of multinational activity is the antitrust laws, which have
used both criminal and civil sanctions to maintain the competitive
market. More recently, the conduct of American based firms which
has concerned investors is that of bribes and corrupt payments to
foreign officials. This conduct has led to proposals to penalize those
corporations making such bribe payments and, in addition, compel-
ling fuller disclosure of such payments. Finally, the activities of
American corporations which have been subversive of foreign gov-
ernments have given rise to congressional and State Department
concern. This latter concern has resulted in proposals for multi-
lateral treaties to control subversive activities of multinational
corporations by host countries and by international organizations.
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A principal concern of the United States is to maintain a world
competitive market with firms operating to maintain investor con-
fidence. Moreover, there is concern that the activities of American
based multinational corporations not interfere with internal politics
of host countries or counteract official American foreign policy. Vig-
orous enforcement of American laws with the application of penal
sanctions to maintain competition and honest business practices is
valid and proper. Nevertheless, effective United States government
action requires coordination with foreign host countries and the
development of international understanding and treaty-code
systems to complement domestic law.
